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Small moment and individual taste
Pietro Gori
1. Science and society
The subject of my study is the note 11 [156] from 1881 (NF, KSA 9, 500 f.),
a very interesting but neglected page in which Nietzsche deals with the
qualities of the individual. What is peculiar of this text is Nietzsche<s
viewpoint, since his statements on the role played by the scientific knowl-
edge are but the starting point of a consideration on morals and society
that he<ll carry out during the later years of thought. Furthermore,
from the ideas presented in this text one can infer a view on the relation-
ship between the individual and the State which can be compared with
Nietzsche<s later observations on perspectivism. In particular, in this
note Nietzsche highlights that if the single man wants to define himself,
then he cannot refer to an “idiosyncratic” perspective, since the basis
which he starts from to build up the fiction of his “ego” reveals its
being completely impermanent. Thus, the reference point of the process
of subjectivization can only be the “normalized” taste peculiar to the
herd, which is created by science, religion and society. Before starting
with the analysis of the text, let me just consider that these observations
take place in an important notebook, since one finds them a few pages
after the first presentation of the idea of eternal recurrence and – most no-
tably – of its description as a scientific cosmology. One must not forget it,
since even though in this note Nietzsche doesn<t refer to his new thought,
his talking about the “unendlich kleine Augenblick” and his stating that
this is but a “Blitzbild aus dem ewigen Flusse” clearly shows that he<s
looking at this topic from a quite definite point of view.
The starting point of Nietzsche<s reasoning is the role played by the
scientific knowledge on the creation of a standardized type of man. He
directly relates science with society and religion, since they all concern
with the definition of the notion of man and subject. Both science and re-
ligion are involved in the process of education and growing of single
human beings, which they carry on by standardizing their taste, i. e. by es-
tablishing a generalized world view. Their main aim is to achieve the uni-
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formity of sensation, a fact that reveals a deep hostility to any individual-
ization. Moreover, the qualities of the common type of man that they cre-
ate have ever been seen as peculiar to the single human being, and one
usually refers to them to define its essence. The role played by the science
is not different. According to Nietzsche, one of its aims is to define the
essence of the species instead of that of the individual, since science con-
siders the former more important than each single man. Moreover, sci-
ence works with concepts, that could only be referred to not-existing
things (bodies, atoms and substances); thus, the scientific world descrip-
tion presents a “reality” in which everything is reduced to a general form.1
In the first lines of the note 11 [156] Nietzsche deals with his theory of
knowledge. Since Human, all too human he thinks that the process of
adaptation and selection of our species led to peculiar ways of modifying
the sense data, and therefore to the creation of a “reality” that he de-
scribes as false and illusory. Then, one must not consider this mere falsi-
fication as a knowledge capable of finding the inner qualities of things –
i. e. that can be properly seen as true. Nevertheless, despite of its being
false and illusory, this image of our world has revealed its usefulness to
the preservation of the species – that<s why we now call it “true”.2
These ideas are clearly stated in the notebook from 1881, since Nietzsche
writes,
[…] daß mit der Feststellung des Wesenhaften nichts fKr die RealitNt [zu]
beweisen sei als daß die Existenz des Menschen bis jetzt vom Glauben an
diese “RealitNt” abgehangen hat (wie Kçrper Dauer der Substanz usw.).
[…] Die erreichte ?hnlichkeit der Empfindung (Kber den Raum, oder das
1 This thought rises from the main ideas on human knowledge which Nietzsche
dealt with since the 1870<s, and that he developed as a biologic and evolutionary
theory of knowledge. In many writings (both published and unpublished)
Nietzsche shows his conceiving the cognitive process as based upon the Darwin-
ian selectionist model (see for example MA, KSA 2, 36 ff. ; FW, KSA 3, 110–11;
NF, KSA 13, 336 ff.). In my opinion, one should include Nietzsche in the list of
those thinkers who upheld a natural selection epistemology or, as Donald Camp-
bell wrote in his essay devoted to the philosophy of Karl Popper, an evolutionary
epistemology (see Donald Campbell, Evolutionary Epistemology, in: Paul A.
Schlipp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, La Salle 1974, vol. I, pp. 413–
463). I concerned with this subject in Pietro Gori, The Usefulness of Substances.
Knowledge, Science and Metaphysics in Nietzsche and Mach, in: Nietzsche-Stud-
ien 38 (2009), pp. 111–155.
2 One can read this statement in some of Nietzsche<s notes of the same years. See
for example NF, KSA 9, 306 and NF, KSA 9, 537.
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ZeitgefKhl oder das Groß- und KleingefKhl) ist eine Existenzbedingung der
Gattung geworden, aber mit der Wahrheit hat es nichts zu thun.
Despite of these observations, the main subject of this note are not pure
theoretical questions. Rather, Nietzsche starts from them to deal with the
role that this kind of knowledge plays on the social plane and, most of all,
on the definition of the essence (Wesen) of the individual. In fact,
Nietzsche writes that the transmission of the standardised world image
build up by the science contributes to the education of each single
man, and involves significant consequences on how he looks at both him-
self and the external world. Thus, one can see how close Nietzsche<s theo-
ry of knowledge and the main questions concerning both the social plane
and the anthropological one that he deals with in his later writings are.
Science is not only a tool created by human beings to master the nature
and become more powerful. Rather, it<s part of their cultural background,
of their history, and one must admit that the world view that follows from
the scientific investigations has many important consequences on human
life.
2. Evaluation of the individual in N V 4 (Autumn 1880)
Both the way of arguing and the topics that Nietzsche presents in this
note can be found in the notepad “N V 4” from the autumn of 1880
(group 6, NF, KSA 9, 194 ff.), which one can refer to, to enlighten his
later observations. During that year Nietzsche wrote some notes on the
common morals, that he contrasted with the idea that one must attribute
the highest values to the individual qualities. What he criticised at the
most in these pages is the creation of a standardized and indeterminate
type of man, a generalization of the human being rose from the removal
of its peculiar traits. Thus, in these notes both the society and the State are
described as institutions geared to the definition of the homo communis,
and therefore opposed to the development of an individual type.
Nietzsche doesn<t agree with this aim. On the contrary, he wants to
give value to the single man with his peculiar view. Therefore he states
that the individual taste could be a resource for the society, if one consid-
ers its value among other individuals: “Der Fortschritt der Moral bes-
tKnde in dem Zberwiegen altruistischer Triebe Kber egoistische und
ebenso der allgemeinen Urtheile Kber die individuellen? Ist jetzt der
locus communis. Ich sehe dagegen das Individuum wachsen, welches
seine wohlverstandenen Interessen gegen andere Individuen vertritt.”
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(NF, KSA 9, 238 f.) Of course, the observations that Nietzsche writes in
this notepad are related with his ideas on morals and tradition that one
can find in the published books, and that constitute one of the most stud-
ied topics of Nietzsche<s philosophy. Instead of dealing with his state-
ments on the role played by the moral norms, I<d like to pay attention
to his concerning with the individual and emphasize the fact that in
1880 he relates it with the social plane, arguing that the latter is the
basis out of which the essence of the single man arises.
In defining his own anthropology Nietzsche gives the higher value to
the individual, since he thinks that it<s the most relevant subject of an in-
vestigation concerning the social structure. One can say that this state-
ment is in compliance with his way of reasoning, since anytime he<s to de-
scribe something he usually pays attention to what can create develop-
ment, i. e. to the dynamic elements capable of modifying the whole struc-
ture. According to this perspective, what Nietzsche sees on the political
plane is hopeless, since the morals of his society is built upon an abstract,
fixed and unchanging – i. e. unreal – type of “man”. “Aus den bisher be-
kannten kann der Begriff []Mensch<] nur so gewonnen sein, daß man das
Individuelle abstreift”, writes Nietzsche, stating that this concept of man
cannot be found, but one must create it, since thereHs nothing but individ-
uals (NF, KSA 9, 237). Contrariwise, hismorals would be devoted to a de-
velopment of the qualities of the individual, to let the single man improve
his own attributes and thus define himself among the other human beings.
Thus, “dem Menschen seinen Allgemeincharakter immer mehr zu neh-
men und ihn zu spezialisiren, bis zu einem Grade unverstNndlicher fKr
die Anderen zu machen” (NF, KSA 9, 237).
The outcome of these observations, as one can imagine, is the com-
plete rejection of any statement defining a standardized being, which
Nietzsche discredits as inferior to each individual nature with its peculiar
traits. According to him, the individual trying to assert itself and its taste
is the starting point of a way that leads to a higher form of existence,
whose main attributes will be defined by the relationship between indi-
viduals. Moreover, this single beings would not be erased by the suprem-
acy of one of them; rather, their being different would be useful to an
endless change of their own qualities. In the same notepad from 1880
Nietzsche shows his upholding a morals that could make the “individual
taste” stand out, a morals that could be understood and rightly developed
only by higher natures. One can compare the way in which Nietzsche de-
fines these type of man with the statements on perspectivism that he
writes during the later years of thought, since they are the example of
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how individual, not-shared views can be asserted – or the example that
there can be a taste peculiar to just one subject. For instance, in the
note 6 [175] 1880 (NF, KSA 9, 242 f.) one reads: “ein singulIres
Werthmaaß im GefKhle haben macht die hçhere Natur”. In contrast to
the common natures, the highest nature trusts in the individuals and in
their peculiar qualities, since it recognises as “human” this skill of assert-
ing themselves as single beings. An asserting that does not lead to a kind
of autarchical isolation, but rather to a relationship with and self-identi-
fication among many other human beings stating the same kind of indi-
vidual values. Thus, the type of man that Nietzsche describes in this note-
pad is neither the member of an herd, who has lost his human nature, nor
an absolute master claming to assert his own taste and overcome the
other individuals. On the contrary, the social model capable of recognis-
ing the value of the individual as single human being is a society in which
anyone can state his own perspective, and compare it with that of the
other citizens. As one can read in the note 6 [163] (NF, KSA 9, 238 f.),
there could be justice between equals only if each individual promotes
other men as individuals (“Gerechtigkeit unter Gleichen, insofern es
[das Individuum] das andere Individuum als solches anerkennt und fçr-
dert”).
3. The infinitely small moment as the highest truth
If one turns now to the note 11 [156] 1881 and compares it with the ob-
servations that Nietzsche states in his notebook from 1880, one can find
many correspondences between them, but also a new perspective on
the role played by the normal taste in defining the essence of human be-
ings. As stated above, with his evaluation of the role played by the science
on the social and cultural plane Nietzsche highlights that it leads human
beings to a kind of feeling (taste and see) that is standardized, common.
This is what Nietzsche calls the uniformity of sensation, something very
useful for creating a social community, but opposite to the identification
of single individuals as members of it. With its description of the world
(according to Nietzsche, a mere schema, a simplification of the “real”
world3), the science carries on the creation of a standardized life, which
has no peculiar quality, an thinks it to be a good definition of the essence
3 See FW, KSA 3, 472 f. and JGB, KSA 5, 28 f.
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of human being itself. For this reason Nietzsche judges this knowledge in
a negative way:
DieErkenntniß, ruhend auf demGlauben an dasBeharrende, steht imDienst
der grçberen Formen des Beharrens (Masse Volk Menschheit) und will die
feineren Formen, den idiosyncrasischenGeschmack ausscheiden und tçdten
– sie arbeitet gegen die Individualisirung, denGeschmack, der nur fKr Einen
Lebensbedingung ist. (NF, KSA 9, 500 ff.)
As one can easily see, Nietzsche contrasts once again a common, standard
nature with a living being asserting its individual perspective. In the last
part of the note Nietzsche deals with the qualities of this individual
being, but he doesn<t reveal which is the relationship between each single
men and the social community that he<s in mind.
The basic element of Nietzsche<s determination of the individual is
the idiosyncratic taste, i. e. the perspective from which anyone sees and in-
terprets the world that should define each single man, since anyone have
a different place among the others. According to Nietzsche, the individu-
al, trying to assert itself over the species, “kNmpft fKr seine Existenz, fKr
seinen neuen Geschmack, fKr seine realtiv einzige Stellung zu allen Din-
gen – es hNlt diese fKr besser als den Allgemeingeschmack und verachtet
ihn. Es will herrschen” (NF, KSA 9, 501). One can define a human being
as an individual just from this attribute, since it<s the basis of its character-
ization and distinction from the generic qualities of the species. That<s
why the individual gives the highest value to its own taste, and claims
that one must see it as different from the normal taste generated by
the herd instinct. The individual refers to this element, since it could be
the only ground to find a sense of its existence and define its peculiar at-
tributes. But, when it seems to be sure of its being able to assert its own
view, the individual finds an upsetting truth, and has to reassess the con-
ditions of defining its attributes. In fact, according to what Nietzsche
writes in this note, the single man realizes that his own taste is completely
impermanent, i. e. that one cannot take it as basis of any kind of determi-
nation. The individual
entdeckt, daß es selber etwas Wandelndes ist und einen wechselnden
Geschmack hat, mit seiner Feinheit gerNth es hinter das Geheimniß, daß
es kein Individuum giebt, daß im kleinsten Augenblick es etwas Anderes
ist als im nNchsten und daß seine Existenzbedingungen die einer Unzahl In-
dividuen sind: der unendlich kleine Augenblick ist die hçhere RealitNt und
Wahrheit, ein Blitzbild aus dem ewigen Flusse. (NF, KSA 9, 502)
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To understand the statements that Nietzsche presents in this note, one
must come back to the notebook from 1880. In fact, the observations
on the role played by the unendlich klein Augenblick on the individual
are strictly related with another topic which Nietzsche deals with many
times: the question of the individual substance. Nietzsche criticizes this
notion as the sign of a metaphysical view in search of some absolute
and unchanging elements to build its own world description. His observa-
tions on the ego play a leading role in his whole thought, and follow from
his reading many scientific essays published during the second half of the
19th century. For example, one can compare the observations written by
Nietzsche during 1880–1881 and his claim that the idea of soul rises
from the dynamic relation of inner drives with the work of W. Roux4.
In the same notebook from 1880 seen upon one can find many interesting
observations on this subject, that could be resumed with this statement:
Das Ich ist nicht die Stellung Eines Wesens zu mehreren […] sondern das
ego ist eine Mehrheit von personenartigen KrNten, von denen bald diese,
bald jene im Vordergrund steht als ego und nach den anderen, wie ein Sub-
jekt nach einer einflußreichen und bestimmenden Außenwelt, hinsieht. Das
Subjekt springt herum. (NF, KSA 9, 211 f.)5
This excerpt is written a few pages after another note that could be rele-
vant for the topic I<m dealing with, since Nietzsche argues that we feel the
external world anytime in different ways “weil sie sich gegen den jedes-
mal in uns Kberwiegenden Trieb abhebt” – an ever-changing drive; “so
ist im kleinsten Momente unsere Empfindung der Außenwelt immer wer-
dend und vergehend, also wechselnd” (NF, KSA 9, 209).
Thus, in 1881 Nietzsche puts the individual in front to the idea of an
impermanent ego and tries to imagine what could happen. His conclusion,
according to what he writes in the note 11 [156] 1881 is that once the in-
dividual realizes this truth it loses its certainties on what it supposed to be
the basis of its self-definition. Both its inclination in asserting itself as sin-
gle subject and its complete rejection of the normalized existence build up
4 See on this topic Wolfgang MKller-Lauter, Der Organismus als innerer Kampf.
Der Einfluss von Wilhelm Roux auf Friedrich Nietzsche, in: Nietzsche-Studien,
7 (1978), pp. 189–223.
5 The question of the ego is one of the main topics that one can find in Nietzsche<s
later notebooks. He dealt with it during the 1880<s, and presented some out-
comes after a long lasting reflection concerning the conscience (see for example
JGB, KSA 5, 29 ff.). A detailed study on this subject has been carried out by
Luca Lupo in his Le colombe dello scettico. Riflessioni di Nietzsche sulla coscien-
za negli anni 1880–1888, Pisa 2006.
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by the social institutions (state, religion and science), collide with the in-
existence of any ontological ground which it could refer to.
4. Towards a dialectic of the individual
The end of the note 11 [156] from 1881 leaves the reader confused. In
thinking about the role played by the individual taste as ground of
human beings< self-determination, Nietzsche realizes that this idea is in
contradiction with his early statements concerning the ego, but he doesn<t
carry his arguing to a solution of this problem. The possible conclusions of
this thought could be two:
(a) The individual simply does not exist. It comes from the “herd” and
cannot be defined on its own. Any description of the essence of
human beings, any definition of a subject, must be referred to the nor-
mal taste.
(b) The individual taste can be taken as basis of the definition of a self,
but one cannot overcome the standardized taste, since the former is
impermanent. The social community – the place where the relation-
ship between individuals takes place – is the necessary reference
point to define the single human beings.
Both the conclusions deny the starting claim of the individual. The single
man cannot win the struggle for his existence just upholding his own taste
against the “normal” one. However, (a) is not in compliance with
Nietzsche<s observations from 1880, since in that year he stated some
ideas in defence of the individual. Even though one year later he enriched
his wordlview with some new ideas (one must remember that in the group
11 from 1881 one finds the first notes on the eternal recurrence), it seems
not suitable to say that Nietzsche completely rejected the role played by
the single subjects presented before. In fact, some pages after the note in
which Nietzsche states the disorientation of the individual in realizing
that the idiosyncratic taste is not stable and unchanging, one finds some
observations that are in compliance with the others written one year be-
fore. In 11 [182] 1881 Nietzsche writes that each single man get his own
attributes from the State, since he<s part of a community. Therefore,
only as member of the State he can recognise himself as individual.
Only afterwards he becomes an opponent of the State, and looks at it
as a menace for his asserting his own qualities – even if he<s been created
by the State itself.
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Er hat jene anderen Eigenschaften noch nicht und erwirbt sie erst als Organ
des Gemeinwesens: als Organ bekommt er die ersten Regungen der sNmmt-
lichen Eigenschaften des Organischen. Die Gesellschaft erzieht erst das
Einzelwesen, formt es zum Halb- oder Ganz-Individuum vor (…). Der
Staat unterdrKckt ursprKnglich nicht etwa die Individuen: diese existiren
noch gar nicht! Er macht den Menschen Kberhaupt die Existenz mçglich,
als Heerdenthieren. Unsere Triebe Affekte werden uns da erst gelehrt:
sie sind nichts UrsprKngliches!
Thus, Nietzsche doesn<t denies the existence of the individuals; he just
limits their ontological value. Then, if one wants to complete the observa-
tions presented in 11 [156] one should consider (b), and imagine that in
1881 Nietzsche is thinking about a kind of “dialectical” relationship be-
tween the individual and the State. This relationship can be summed up
in this way: 1. the State generates a normal taste and defines the individ-
uals as single subjects sharing it; 2. the individual develops a taste of its
own and tries to get rid of the State, claming that the idiosyncratic
taste could be a good basis to define its essence; 3. the individual becomes
aware of the ontological lack of content laying under its self-defining as
subject opposed to any common being. Thus, it needs someone to recog-
nise it as holder of a peculiar perspective of world-interpretation, since
otherwise its singularity must be denied. But the source of this identifica-
tion can only be the State itself. Therefore, the dialectical relationship:
the individual wants its taste to master the standardized view of the
State, but it needs the State to make sense of its being individual.
This way of arguing – a mere hypothesis on how to complete
Nietzsche<s observations – is not far from the ideas that he presented in
those years, and also later. In fact, even though Nietzsche criticized
many time the State for its generating a normalized life being, during
the 1880 he admits that it plays a leading role in defining the essence
of the single human beings. Moreover, as stated above, is exactly the
State that gives sense to the “highest natures” (see NF, KSA 9, 242 f.).
But the statements presented in 11 [156] can also be related with another
important topic which Nietzsche dealt with during the last years of
thought. In fact, some of his reflections concerning the perspectivism
are in compliance with this way of looking at the relationship of the
mass (from 1881 “herd”) and the individual, so as with the observations
on science and knowledge presented in the first part of the note. Even
though the idea of a perspectival interpretation is usually related with
the statement according to which there are as many viewpoints, as the
number of beings (and for that reason one can relate the observations
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written in the notebook from 1880 with it), when Nietzsche talks about
the social plane the question seems to be different. Briefly, one can con-
sider what Nietzsche writes in Gay Science 354, where the single view-
points, the single perspectives of world interpretation are described as
less relevant than the wider perspective of the herd. Nietzsche<s observa-
tion in 11 [156] 1881, his stating “daß es kein Individuum giebt, daß im
kleinsten Augenblick es etwas Anderes ist als im nNchsten und daß
seine Existenzbedingungen die einer Unzahl Individuen sind” (my italic)
sounds quite similar to his claim that the subject of the perspectivism is
the herd, and not any single human being.6 Of course, the perspective
of the State (expressed by science, religion and society) is unnatural, ar-
tificial, it<s something created by human beings during their history. Nev-
ertheless, it<s the only view that could be seen as (relatively) stable, and
for that reason one can take it as basis of a world description. As stated
above, is the lack of content of the idiosyncratic taste and its being unsta-
ble that make impossible a definition of the essence of the individual on
its own.
5. Critique and AufklNrung
If one accepts (b), then one can sum up Nietzsche<s statements in other
terms, and say that in 1881 he<s arguing that the individual<s inclination
to be a stateless cannot be developed, since there<s no ground out of
which it can rise. The final outcome of his thought is therefore to see
the State as the only place where human beings could become subjects.
The question: “What can help us to solve this dialectic, or at least to de-
6 In 4 [172] 1882 (NF, KSA 10, 162) one can find this idea, that Nietzsche will pres-
ent to his readers only five years later: “Es sind nicht unsere Perspektiven, in
denen wir die Dinge sehen; aber es sind Perspektiven eines Wesens nach unserer
Art, eines grçßeren: in dessen Bilder wir hineinblicken”. In the last part of Frçh-
liche Wissenschaft 354 (FW, KSA 3, 590 ff.), after some important remarks on
conscience, Nietzsche talks about “the true phenomenalism and perspectivism”,
claming that there cannot be any individual view, but only a standardized one,
which is useful to the preservation of the species. Of course, one must discuss
this statement, first of all for its apparently being opposite to other well
known notes in which Nietzsche talks about “every centre of force” as holder
of a peculiar world view. For further details on this topic see Pietro Gori, Feno-
menalismo e prospettivismo in Gaia Scienza, 354, in: Giuliano Campioni, Chiara
Piazzesi, Patrick Wotling (a cura di), Letture della Gaia Scienza. Atti del conveg-
no GIRN di Reims (12–13 marzo 2009), Pisa 2010, pp. 105–118.
Pietro Gori164
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated | 212.87.45.97
Download Date | 9/7/12 4:39 PM
fine it in a better way?” can thus be answered by referring to another au-
thor which statements are strictly related to Nietzsche<s thought: Michel
Foucault.
The investigation of the political power as basis of a process of sub-
jectivization is one of the main contributions of Foucault<s thought.
With regard to the subject of my study, I<m interested in the observations
that he presents on the notions of AufklIrung (as stated by Kant) and cri-
tique. The writing I<m referring to is a late lecture in which Foucault deals
with this topic: QuHest-ce que la critique? (Critique et AufklIrung)7. Be-
yond the question of power, which plays a leading role in Foucault<s
thought, this lecture concerns another subject that could be related
with the observations on the relationship between individual and society
– or between individual and form of government – that one finds in
Nietzsche<s notebooks from 1880 and 1881. What one especially finds
in this writing is Foucault<s stating the active role that each man should
be able to play in the social dimension and that he needs to recognise
himself as subject. Foucault considers the relationship between power,
truth and subject, and shows that the latter must not be seen as bound
by an unchangeable definition of itself. Rather, it can play an active
part in the evaluation and renewal of the existing form of government.
According to Foucault, the notion of AufklIrung involves a well definite
relationship between the citizen and the State. What is peculiar of this re-
lationship is the active role played by the individual, since each single
man both checks the State<s working and claims his right to call it into
question – an even modify it. Moreover, Foucault writes that the ques-
tions involving power, truth and subject are all interlinked; thus, “the cri-
tique is the starting point of a movement through which the subject claims
his right to call into question both the truth as having effects on the de-
velopment of power and the power as defining what is truth”8. In the
Kantian notion of AufklIrung, and of course in his idea of “human be-
ing<s emergence from his self-incurred minority”, Foucault finds this
new way of thinking the relationship between the single man and the
7 Michel Foucault, QuHest-ce que la critique? (Critique et AufklNrung), in: Bullet-
tin de la Societ` FranÅaise de Philosophie, Paris 1990, pp. 35–63. Another text in
which Foucault deals with some questions related with the subject of this speech
is The Subject and Power, in: Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (eds.), Mi-
chel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Brighton 1982,
pp. 208–226.
8 Michel Foucault, QuHest-ce que la critique? (Critique et AufklNrung), in : Bullet-
tin de la Societ` FranÅaise de Philosophie, Paris 1990, p. 39.
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power. Therefore, the critique is related to the inclination of the subject
of being stateless and to its restlessness, which characterize each man
even if he accepts to shape his individuality in a new form, as condition
to be part of the society.9 Then, the question is: in which way should
one conceive the power? Even though one needs it to set up a society,
the power can change its forms, together with the other subjects involved
in this process. In other words – as one can read in Foucault<s lecture –
one must not conceive the power as supremacy, as lordship, as a basic and
unchangeable ground, which would be the only explicative principle and
therefore a necessarily law: on the contrary, one must consider it as one sin-
gle part of a field of relations, i. e. as gather together with forms of knowl-
edge by a link that cannot be released. One always finds the power into a
field of possibilities, therefore of reversion, i. e. it can be modified at any
time.10
The critique finds place in this field of possibilities, and its working obvi-
ously involves the question of the subjectivization, too, since it<s related
with the existing power which defines both the society and all its mem-
bers. If one calls into question the form of government, that involves
also his own characterization. According to Foucault, this could be the
only possible way of getting rid of the State, since it would promote
new forms of subjectivity.11 If it<s not possible a complete liberation
from the State, the critique is the only tool one can use to claim both
the maturity and the independence of the individual.
In my opinion, the observations stated by Foucault can be linked with
Nietzsche<s view to complete the reasoning that the latter outlines in his
notebooks. The notion of critique can be useful to define in a better way
the dialectical relationship between the individual and the State, since this
form of political participation considers both the subjects involved in this
relationship, the wider one (the society) and the single one (each individ-
ual). Both the necessity of the State and the active role played by each
citizen are preserved, without leading the society to a form of static bal-
ance. In other words, through the critique one can define a morals that
9 As one can read in Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in: Hubert L. Drey-
fus and Paul Rabinow (eds.), Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and Herme-
neutics, Brighton 1982, p. 214.
10 Michel Foucault, QuHest-ce que la critique? (Critique et AufklNrung), in: Bullet-
tin de la Societ` FranÅaise de Philosophie, Paris 1990 p. 52.
11 Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in: Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabi-
now (eds.), Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Brighton
1982, p. 216.
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could account for the value of each single man, who would control the
worth and legitimacy of the existing government and find in it the source
of his being subject.
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